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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HAMILTON BORUP,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs

MARJORIE CHANDLER BORUP,

Case No. 14387

Defendant and Respondent.
APPELLANTSf BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The plaintiff above named, the appellant herein,
filed an action for divorce against the defendant and
respondent herein.

Trial was had before the Honorable

CALVIN GOULD and judgment rendered therein.

All references

herein to the record of the case will be designated as (R);
all references to the transcript will be designated as (T).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court granted defendant-respondent a divorce,
approved the Stipulation of the parties in all respects
except as to an unstipulated matter pertaining to support

-2money for the minor children of the parties and as to this
matter made the following order in the Decree:
3. Plaintiff is ordered and required to pay to the defendant
child support and alimony as follows: $600.00 per month
until June 1, 1976; $500.0.0 until September 1, 1976 with
$100.00 of said amount to be alimony; thereafter child
support in the sum of $85.00 per month per child until
the youngest child's 21st birthday;provided the child is
enrolled in college, trade or business school within 5months of high school graduation- or is physically unable
to provide his or her own support" (R.z7; (Emphasis ours).
It is to be noted that

the provision of the Decree

relating to support money does not conform with the decision
announced from the bench as shown by the Memorandum Decision
of the Court (R.20) which reads as follows:
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child
until the respective child's 21st birthday,who is either:
(a)

Enrolled in college or trade or business school
beyond high school within 4 months from high
school graduation; or

(b)

Physically unable to provide his or her own
support.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Decree reviewed,

reversed or modified only in respect to the part requiring the appellant to pay support money under any circumstances until the minor children are 21 years of age.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts insofar as they are pertinent to this
appeal show that the parties hereto were married in May
1953.

As issue of the marriage 7 children were born to the

-3parties, who at the time of the divorce were MARK, age 19
years; MELVIN, age 17 years; JERRY, age 16 years; KELLIE
JEAN, age 14 years; PHILLIP, age 10 years, CARL, age 9 years;
and LANCE, age 4 years.

(R.l).

During the marriage the parties accumulated certain properties and debts that were divided among them by
Stipulation in open court.

(T.36, 38, 39, 40, 41) (R.24, 25,

27, 28).
The Court took under advisement the unresolved
issue as to whether support money should be paid for the
minor children of the parties until age 18 or whether the
Court had the authority to extend the time to age 21.

The

Court by Memorandum Decision (R.20) rendered judgment in
this respect as follows:
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child
until the respective child's 21st birthday, who is either:
(a)

Enrolled in college or trade or business school
beyond high school within 4 months from high
school graduation; or

(b)

Physically unable to provide his or her own
support.
The Decree drawn by respondent's counsel did

not conform to the above and provided as follows in respect
to support money:
3.*******thereafter child support in the sum of $85.00
per month per child until the youngest child's 21st birthday; provided the child is enrolled xin college, trade
or business school within 4 months of high school graduation or is physically unable to provide his or her own
support. (R.27) (Emphasis ours).

-4ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO CONTINUE
TO PAY SUPPORT MONEY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES UNTIL THE 21st
BIRTHDAY OF EACH CHILD.
Although the Decree in paragraph 3 (R.27) states
that the child support was to be in the sum of $85.00 per
month until the youngest child was 21 years of age,(Emphasis
ours) this was in clear contravention of the Memorandum
Decision of the Court (R.20) that provided:
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child
until the respective child1s 21st birthday, who is either:
(a)

Enrolled in college or trade or business school
beyond high school within 4 months from high
school graduation, or

(b)

Physically unable to provide his or her own
support.
If the wording of the Decree were to be upheld,

it would mean that the support money for each child would
continue until the youngest child (LANCE, who is now 4 years
of age) was 21 years old.

This could mean that when LANCE

is 21, 17 years hence, that MARK would be 36; MELVIN, 34;
JERRY, 33; KELLIE JEAN, 31; PHILLIP, 27; and CARL, 26 and
that during all of this time that the appellant would be
required to pay $85.00 a month for each of said children.
For that reason alone the Decree in regard to the
support money payment should not be allowed to stand.

-5The Court did not so intend, as is shown by
the Memorandum Decision of the Court (R.20),and the law
does not so provide.

Section 15-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,

enacted in the last regular session of the legislature provides:
The period of minority extends in males and females to
the age 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority
by marriage. It is further provided that courts in
divorce actions may order support to age 21.
The above-cited statute

provides that under

no conceivable circumstances could support be ordered
beyond age 21.
Although the wording of the Decree does not
conform to the intent of the Court shown by the Memorandum
Decision (R.20), if the intent of the Court was:
1. The plaintiff is to continue support for each child
until the respective child's 21st birthday, who is either:
(a)

Enrolled in college or trade or business school
beyond high school within 4 months from high
school graduation, or

(b)

Physically unable to provide his or her own
support;

the case should still be reversed in regard to the objectionable provision and the case remanded for modification of the
Decree.
This is apparently the first time the Supreme Court
of our state has been called upon to interpret the abovequoted statute (15-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, as amended).

This

-6statute, apparently, is the legislature's product in the
aftermath of STANTON vs. STANTON (43 L. ED.,2d 688) in which
the United States Supreme Court held that Utah's former
statute making the age of majority of a female 18 years and
of a male 21 years to be violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This was an appeal of

the Utah State Supreme Court of STANTON vs. STANTON,30, Utah
2d, 315, 517 Pacific 2d, 1010) (1974).
Although the STANTON case in Utah Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court dealt with various related matters, the main thrust of the case was that there
was a denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution if the father's obligation to
support a daughter terminated at age 18, but continued until
age 21 for a son.
It is the contention of the appellant that there
is discrimination present in the case at hand, although not
on the basis of sex.

The decision of the Court requiring

him to continue to support his children after age 18 is still
discriminatory and violative of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution.

Under the provisions of 15-2-1, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended the appellant because he
divorced the minor children's mother can be required to continue to support the children until they are 21. However,

-7if the appellant had continued to be married to the children's
mother, no matter what the relationship, under no circumstances
could he be compelled to support the

children beyond age 18,

they having reached the age of majority, but by the terms of
15-2-1, it is provided that courts in divorce actions may
order support to age 21.
Where is the equal protection of the laws if at
the time of a divorce or even thereafter a divorced father
can be compelled to support his children until they are
21 years of age, but the father who remains married regardless of the relations between father and mother need only
support his children until they are 18 and under no pro»

vision of the law can he be compelled to continue support
thereafter?

Obviously, the father who is divorced is dis-

criminated against and does not have the equal protection
of the law as guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.
The Court in its initial observation of the matter
concluded he was without authority to make an award of support money that continued beyond age 18 (T.37):
THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt counsel. I don't believe
that a judge having a divorce case prior to
the time the children reach the age of 18 can
make that determination. I think that is a
'••••*> discretionary determination that has to be
made at that point.
We submit that even though the statute is discriminatory and violative of the Equal Protection Clause

-8of the Constitution of the United States, that if such a
determination were to be made at all,it should be when
the child has reached age 18 and a need for the continuation
of the support money is shown at a proper hearing or if there
is evidence before the Court that the child is because of
physical or mental defects unable to provide for himself
between the ages of 18 and 21 and there were no other resources available to said child.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record
whatsoever to substantiate the contingencies provided for
by the Court in the Memorandum Decision or the Decree in
regard to education or physical disabilities.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended provides the continuing jurisdiction of the court
in these matters as follows (only the portion of the statute
deemed as pertinent is quoted):
*******The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect
to the support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support and maintenance
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary*******.
If it is deemed that support money for minor children should continue beyond the age of 18 years, this matter
should be left to the future determination by the court under its continuing jurisdiction upon a proper hearing at the

-9proper time when the said minors have reached the age of
18 years.

See McLEAN vs. McLEAN, 523, Pacific 2d, 862,

RIDGE vs RIDGE, 542, Pacific 2d, 189.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE B. HANDY, ESQUIRE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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